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OPENING
When Curt Bradley* asked me to speak at his new center, I
accepted with pleasure. Curt was a wise counselor at the State
Department, and I am delighted that he is now directing a center that
is focused on teaching and research in the areas in which my lawyers
and I work daily.
INTRODUCTION
Today, I would like to take advantage of the fact that I am in the
company of students and scholars to reflect on some of my
experiences over the past year—to put what I have seen and heard
into perspective. For the past twelve months, on behalf of the
Secretary of State, I have been engaged in an intensive dialog with
our European partners on some of the most contentious and
misunderstood issues of the day: namely, our counterterrorism laws
and policies, especially those relating to the detention, questioning,
and transfer of members of al Qaida and the Taliban. Those
discussions have not always been easy, but I believe we have made
headway in explaining to our European partners our laws and
policies, including recent legal developments, such as the new
Department of Defense detention and interrogation policies.
When I began this dialog a year ago, I felt that our disagreements
did not reflect a growing transatlantic divide. I continue to believe
that, and still think many of our so-called differences are rooted in
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misunderstanding, but I also believe that we do have different
approaches on some issues.
George Bernard Shaw famously said that the United States and
England are two countries divided by a common language. There are
times when observers could be forgiven for wondering whether the
United States and Europe are two cultures divided by a common
system of (international) law. Reading the headlines, one would
think that we have profoundly different, perhaps even irreconcilable,
visions of international law and international legal order. But how do
you square this with our longstanding—and shared—traditions of rule
of law and respect for law? Or the network of treaties, institutions,
and regimes that bind us and through which we work and cooperate
successfully on a daily basis? Or the fact that the international legal
framework that exists today was one the United States—with its
European allies—was instrumental in creating?
The plain fact is that we have more in common than not. But
this is sometimes forgotten, and our differences are distorted or
magnified in ways that prevent, rather than promote, mutual
understanding. Why? A somewhat glib explanation might be that
this is the “narcissism of minor differences” at work. The term—
coined by Freud—describes the phenomenon of fundamentally
similar peoples who seize upon their minor differences, exaggerating
them to the point of caricature or conflict. There may be some truth
there, but if you look at the issues that have been the most divisive,
they are primarily in the high-stakes, emotionally fraught field of
combating transnational terrorism. Thus, in the larger scheme they
may be minor differences, but they are not differences on minor
issues.
What troubles me deeply, however, about the discussion of
transatlantic differences is the conclusion that is sometimes drawn:
that the United States, unlike its European partners, does not take
international law seriously. This is patently wrong—and dangerous.
Having differences is normal and natural, but turning them into
something they are not—a cartoonish picture of the United States as
an international actor that cares only about power, not law—erodes
trust and impedes dialog.
Because this issue is so important, I want to take a moment to
address it, before offering some thoughts on the nature and source of
transatlantic differences and misunderstandings. Then I will discuss
in greater detail a few areas in which such differences have surfaced.
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I. THE UNITED STATES IS
SERIOUS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL LAW
The U.S. Government believes that international law matters.
The seriousness with which we take international law is evident in
both our approach to its making and in our commitment to the
resulting obligations. It is also reflected in our record of leadership
on issues where international action is not merely desired, but is truly
required. The irony is that this very seriousness can sometimes work
against us.
Let me illustrate. Because we take our international obligations
seriously, we do not enter into them lightly. In negotiations, my
lawyers and I push for clarity of language—Congress and the public
need to know what we are signing up to. Unfortunately, our efforts
to fend off fudged language are sometimes criticized as obstructionist,
or as attempts to block consensus.
In addition, we will not join a treaty until we know we can
implement it. In some cases, it proves difficult or impossible to get
implementing legislation—even when we are already substantially
compliant with the obligations the treaty would impose. Contrast this
with the many countries that join first and tackle implementation
later—an approach particularly common in the fields of international
environmental and human rights law. The result is that the United
States can look like a laggard or malingerer, reluctant to make an
international commitment. Ironically, in such cases we take a bigger
reputational hit than those countries that join but then utterly fail to
comply. Compliance issues do not lend themselves so readily to the
sound-bite.
A related issue is our greater reluctance to sign up to a treaty
simply to join consensus or set international standards, especially
when we need to ignore well-founded concerns in order to do so. This
can cost us, particularly when the treaty is—or seems to be—on a
feel-good topic. For example, we have recently taken a drubbing
over the UNESCO Cultural Diversity Convention, accused of being
against culture, against diversity, and against treaties. This is
nonsensical. The United States is one of the most multicultural
nations on the planet. The Convention, however, reflects in part the
efforts of some countries to engage in protectionist behavior under
the guise of diversity. Its ambiguous language can be read to permit
the imposition of restrictive trade measures on goods and services
defined as “cultural,” including books, newspapers, magazines, and
perhaps even internet content. This could subvert other international
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mechanisms, such as the WTO,* and could, by hindering the free flow
of information, raise human rights concerns. It is also inconsistent
with the values embodied in our First Amendment.
Failure to join a treaty regime, however, should not be equated
with a lack of respect for international law. Nor should it be viewed
as a lack of concern for the underlying substantive issue. There are
more ways than one to demonstrate commitment. For example, in
the case of the recently concluded U.N. Disabilities Treaty, we
participated actively in the drafting and provided expert advice,
although we do not intend to become a party. Our basic position—
stemming in part from our experience with the Americans with
Disabilities Act—is that the best way to improve the life of the
world’s disabled is for countries to concentrate on their domestic legal
frameworks.
In contrast, on difficult issues that clearly do require
international action, the United States has for years been a leader.
Consider one example. When the United States adopted the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, no other developed nation was willing
to treat the bribery of foreign government officials by businesses as
an impediment to international development and commerce. U.S.
companies complained bitterly that our principled stand left them at a
competitive disadvantage, and pointed out that for some European
companies, such bribes were not only not illegal, but tax deductible.
A quarter century of U.S. leadership, however, has led to both the
OECD** Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Government
Officials and the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Without this
leadership it is doubtful that we would now have these international
regimes that serve the public interest in good government and
transparency.
Before moving on, I want to briefly raise one last issue—the
perception that the U.S. Government not only fails to take
international law seriously, but that we believe we can ignore it
altogether. To some extent, this view has reached the public
consciousness through a narrow academic debate regarding the
relationship between the Constitution and international law. It is
sometimes recast like this: the United States, unlike many European
countries willing to subordinate themselves to international law,

* World Trade Organization
** Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
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places the Constitution above all else, and believes that presidential
power reigns supreme.
This is simply not true. International law can form part of our
national law. In fact, the Constitution has the effect of incorporating
treaties into U.S. law, and it is thus silly to assert, as some have, that
the United States believes that treaties are not binding on us. On the
contrary, we certainly do recognize that they are binding. The
Constitution also authorizes Congress to implement the “Law of
Nations,” what we now call customary international law. In these
situations, compliance with international law becomes a matter of
U.S. law.
II. THE NATURE AND SOURCE
OF SOME TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES AND
MISUNDERSTANDINGS
The issues that I have just discussed highlight some general
differences in approaches to international law, and so are a good
jumping-off point to a more specific discussion of transatlantic
differences and misunderstandings. The United States and some of
its European allies do have a number of differences on international
law, on a variety of levels: interpretive, substantive, institutional or
process-related, and philosophical. But in this past year, I have
realized that a surprising number of our so-called differences are
overblown or erroneous, the product of faulty premises or shoddy
analysis. For example, often what is billed as a legal difference is
really a difference in policy; this type of mistake crops up with the
issue of detainee status, which I will discuss in more detail later on.
People also regularly fall into the classic comparative law trap of
contrasting an idealized version of their own legal system with the
failures or aberrations of the foreign system—and then extrapolate a
set of conclusions. This is made all too easy by the natural asymmetry
in information, where impressions of foreign systems are formed
primarily by news reports. Take Abu Ghraib. The abhorrent
incidents of abuse of detainees by U.S. personnel created the
perception in the minds of some that the U.S. Government condones
torture. Repugnant and unlawful behavior becomes, in some minds,
representative of U.S. policy. The United States, however, has taken
steps to prosecute and punish such illegal behavior as well as to clarify
treatment standards, for instance, by adopting the new Department of
Defense detention and interrogation policies.
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Such
issues
aside,
many
of
our differences—and
misunderstandings—can be traced to our distinct historical
experiences and our legal cultures, traditions, and systems. Our
respective milieu have shaped not only our approaches and attitudes
to international law, but our expectations of what international law
can and should do.
Our radically different experiences of World War II go some way
towards explaining our respective approaches to international law.
The United States emerged from the War with a pride in our nation
and an unshaken faith in our institutions of democratic selfgovernance. For us, international law remained primarily a way to
order relations among essentially self-reliant states. In contrast, many
European countries were scarred by their experience with
nationalism and popular politics. They lost confidence in the ability
of national government to protect them not just from neighboring
countries, but from their own worst selves. Some looked to
international law as a greater good, a way to constrain some of the
forces that had wreaked such havoc. These different experiences may
help explain why Europeans appear more eager to legalize or
judicialize international issues, even at the expense of domestic selfgovernment, whereas Americans are more comfortable allowing
issues to be sorted out in the fields of politics or international
relations.
Our legal traditions and cultures have also affected how we
engage on international legal issues. I am of necessity overstating,
and simplifying complex issues, but there is a core of truth in the
notion that our common law tradition and legal and political culture
incline us to pragmatism and skepticism; we probe the purpose and
function of law, examine it through the lenses of other disciplines
such as economics and sociology, weigh its costs against its benefits,
test its flexibility against the facts at hand, judge its value by its
effectiveness, and seek, where we can, an equitable solution. We also
have a tendency to approach legal solutions via the virtues that have
been drummed into us: the proper starting point is a live case or
controversy, not an abstract one; the issue must have reached a
certain level of ripeness; and the solutions should be narrowly
tailored—to survive the test of future fact patterns and possible
challenge through the political process.
When we bring this pragmatic, problem-oriented approach to the
international arena, our partners who are steeped in Continental legal
and political traditions look at us askance. They are the products of a
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tradition premised upon respect for abstract general principles and a
rigorous and consistent application of a codified set of comprehensive
rules. Their commitment to this approach is not merely intellectual.
They see the peace, prosperity and respect for human rights that
Europe has developed since World War II as resting on this approach
to international law. To them, our approach can appear opportunistic
or, worse, self-serving. In turn, we are sometimes taken aback by
what we see among certain Europeans as an excessive formalism, a
doctrinal inflexibility, and an unwillingness to acknowledge that
different paths may lead to the same end.
Our problem-oriented approach also predisposes us to
distinguish between issues that we believe lend themselves to
international legal resolution and those that do not. This can be at
odds with a European tendency—heightened by experience with the
European Union—to see the ideal international legal framework as
one that is comprehensive and cohesive, that covers the field.
Europeans are more likely than we are to try to fill perceived gaps in
the international framework, and to promote a synthetic, selfregulating international legal system. To us, this can look like an
almost unquenchable desire for more law and process, a desire that is
particularly mystifying when it comes at the expense of domestic selfgovernment.
Finally, there is an important set of differences arising out of the
relationships between international and domestic legal systems. I will
touch on just one, a key one. The soon-to-be twenty-seven members
of the European Union accept the role of an international tribunal,
the European Court of Justice, as the final arbiter of questions of
European law that have direct effect in their domestic law. Those
countries and the other nineteen members of the Council of Europe
also defer to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights,
and domestic legislation in some countries gives direct effect to the
decisions of that court. In the United States, in contrast, a debate
exists as to whether our government has the authority to delegate to
international tribunals the power to decide questions of international
law that would have direct effect in our domestic law. But let us turn
now to some concrete examples to examine in more detail how some
transatlantic differences, imagined and real, misapprehended and not,
play out.
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III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a fitting place to start,
because our decision to “unsign” the Rome Statute—that is, to notify
the U.N., as depository of the Rome Statute, that we did not intend to
become a party—sparked accusations of unilateralism and helped
foster a view of the United States that has haunted subsequent
actions and decisions. Indeed, the story is sometimes framed as that
of a superpower unwilling to accept any fetters on its freedom to act.
In this story, we are contrasted to the Europeans, who—the better
international citizens—are more willing to abide by international
rules and submit their issues to international adjudication.
The story is easy to tell and simple to grasp, in part because it fits
so nicely into a certain set of preconceived notions—but it happens
not to be true. We share with the parties to the Rome Statute a
commitment to ensuring accountability for genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. Our record is strong and clear: from
Nuremberg to our unwavering support for the U.N. tribunals
established to prosecute crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.
What we disagree with is the ICC’s method for achieving
accountability. Our concerns are not frivolous, although to those who
are products of different traditions these concerns may not be
immediately convincing. It is a deeply held American belief that
power needs to be checked and public actors need to be held
accountable. From the U.S. perspective, the ICC lacks necessary
checks and balances, in part because the Rome Statute gives the ICC
prosecutor the ability to initiate cases without appropriate oversight
by the U.N. Security Council, creating an undue risk of politicized
prosecutions. We also object on principle to the ICC’s claim of
jurisdiction over persons from non-party states.
It is because of these and other flaws that we were unable to
become a party to the Rome Statute. Should we have become a party
despite these concerns? Would that have reflected a deeper
commitment to the rule of law and proved us to be better
international citizens? Some may think so, but I disagree. In fact,
reaching back to a point I made previously, I think our actions show
the opposite—how seriously we take international law. Embracing
the Rome Statute in spite of our serious concerns could only reflect a
cavalier attitude towards the Court and international law more
generally.

08__BELLINGER.DOC

2007]

10/4/2007 9:58:01 AM

REFLECTIONS ON TRANSATLANTIC APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

521

Is this approach utterly at odds with that of other countries? Not
really. It is natural for states to weigh the pros and cons of a
particular action and make their choices accordingly. For example,
we have not signed up to the ICC, but have submitted ourselves to
the jurisdiction of other adjudicative or arbitral bodies, such as the
World Trade Organization and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. In the
context of the International Court of Justice, we do not accept the
court’s compulsory jurisdiction, but are not alone in this respect.
Several major European powers have not: for example, France,
Germany, and Italy. In fact, only one of the five permanent members
of the Security Council has done so—the United Kingdom, with a
number of reservations.
I also don’t think that our decision on the ICC reflects a gap in
values with the Europeans. We were weighing the same principles
and considerations; we just reached a different result. We were
deeply concerned about good process, institutional design, and the
principle of political accountability. But our decision was in no way a
vote for impunity. We were confident that our domestic system was
capable of prosecuting and punishing our citizens for these crimes.
IV. STATUS OF DETAINEES AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS
The unfortunate image of the United States as unwilling to be
bound by rules has spilled over into other issues, particularly in the
field of international humanitarian law. Take the issue of whether the
United States was wrong not to give prisoner of war status to people
we picked up on the battlefields of Afghanistan. This is a subject on
which there can be an honest policy disagreement. However, it is
wrong to say, as I have heard many times in Europe, that there was
no legal basis for our decision.
The United States did not invent the concept of “unlawful enemy
combatants” to put people into a legal black hole. The distinction
between lawful and unlawful combatants has deep roots in
international humanitarian law—it can be traced back to The Hague
Regulations of 1899 and 1907. Moreover, as a matter of law, al Qaida
and Taliban detainees are simply not entitled to prisoner of war
(POW) status. The Third Geneva Convention does not ensure that
everyone who takes up weapons on a battlefield receives POW status.
In fact, the bulk of Third Convention protections, including POW
status, are limited to belligerents engaged in an international armed
conflict. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision reflects that the
conflict between the United States and al Qaida is not an
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international armed conflict, which means that captured al Qaida
fighters are not entitled to POW protections. In contrast, although
we are in an international armed conflict with the Taliban, which was
the effective government of a party to the Geneva Conventions, the
Taliban’s fighters did not meet Third Convention requirements
because they did not carry arms openly, wear a uniform recognizable
at a distance, or respect the laws and customs of war.
Some have argued that even if the Taliban and al Qaida are not
entitled to POW status as a matter of law, the United States should
grant them POW status as a matter of policy. In fact, U.S.
policymakers seriously considered doing this in 2002, but ultimately
rejected this approach because they concluded that it would not serve
the purposes of the Geneva Conventions to give POW status to a
group responsible for the slaughter of thousands in disregard of the
law of war.
The Third Convention creates a compact for those engaged in
international armed conflict. Engage lawfully in combat and, if
captured, you will receive comprehensive treatment protections.
Ignore the laws of war, and you will not be entitled to those
protections. POW status can thus be seen as an incentive to follow
the rules. Weaken that incentive and the losers would be not only our
own soldiers, but civilians—who bear the brunt of suffering when
unlawful combatants operate surreptitiously within the general
population.
Our decision to try these unlawful combatants before military
commissions has also been roundly criticized, but when our critics see
how the recently signed Military Commissions Act works in practice,
I believe they will realize that it offers an appropriate framework for
these trials. The Act provides all of the fundamental guarantees of
fairness and due process, and addresses many concerns expressed by
the international community. For example, the accused have an
unqualified right to hear all the evidence against them and may
appeal their convictions all the way to the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, for some, any form of military justice carries a
whiff of summary justice. The United States, however, has a long and
honorable tradition of military justice that is worthy of respect in both
its design and its functioning. Just look at the zealous advocacy of
those military lawyers assigned to defend Guantanamo detainees. In
some countries like Germany, for example, where there is no
comparable tradition of military justice, the image of a kangaroo
court is hard to shake.
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V. PRIVACY
Finally, one area in which we have seen a difference in approach
between the United States and Europe is in how each balances state
security and personal privacy. As the U.S. Government increasingly
looks for technological means of improving counterterrorism
defenses, such as by building up electronic databases, foreign calls to
protect data privacy have grown. In recent years, many Europeans
traveling to the United States have become alarmed at our
government’s increasing demands for personal information. This
conflict has played out most noticeably in difficult negotiations
between the United States and the European Union, in 2004 and
again this year, over our requirement that airlines electronically
supply the Department of Homeland Security with extensive data, socalled passenger name records (PNR), on all arriving international
travelers.
There are genuine differences between the underlying American
and European legal regimes for protecting personal privacy.
European Union member states have highly formal systems grounded
in comprehensive laws, presided over by independent data protection
commissioners. In particular, they limit the access of private firms to
personal data. In the United States, privacy protections are more
diffuse and decentralized, comprising a patchwork, flexible “common
law” of privacy made up of constitutional, statutory and regulatory
provisions. Other than medical records, we do not systematically and
comprehensively regulate the efforts of private firms to acquire
personal data. We also have no tradition of data protection
commissioners. Ironically, however, in some areas, Europeans
appear more willing to accept intrusions on their privacy than we are.
For example, Britons submit to widespread video surveillance of
public places, and Europeans universally carry national identity cards,
something that does not exist in the United States, where even
proposals to standardize state drivers’ licenses meet with widespread
anxiety.
Despite our differences, however, we have worked out mutually
acceptable transatlantic privacy protections in the counterterrorism
context. In 2002, an agreement was reached for sharing personal data
between U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and its new
European counterpart, the European Police Agency (Europol). In
2003, the United States and the EU concluded historic agreements on
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and on extradition,
regulating among other things the terms for sharing personal data
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needed for use in criminal proceedings in the other’s territory. Just
last week an agreement was signed with Eurojust, a new EU
organization responsible for coordinating serious trans-border
criminal proceedings, which will provide an enhanced basis for
transatlantic prosecutorial cooperation. Even the sensitive question
of sharing PNR data has been successfully settled between the United
States and the EU, reassuring European passengers that their
personal information is being safeguarded while giving the
Department of Homeland Security a valuable tool for keeping
terrorists and other criminals from our shores.
Now a more ambitious effort is in the offing—the development
of a framework agreement. At a meeting in Washington on
November 6, Attorney General Gonzales and Secretary of Homeland
Security Chertoff and their European counterparts commissioned
senior experts from their ministries and from the State Department to
examine whether wide-ranging agreement would be possible in the
law enforcement and border security areas. The fact that this
initiative is being taken up shows that in this particular area,
American and European approaches to protecting privacy are coming
together rather than moving apart.
CONCLUSION
All of these areas of legal differences and misunderstanding
underscore the timeliness of creating a center devoted to
international and comparative law. Let me presume upon your
hospitality to offer some of my hopes about what this Center might
become.
First, I am confident that under Curt’s leadership, this Center
will address an unfortunate isolationist tendency in contemporary
U.S. international and comparative law teaching and scholarship.
This isolationism is not from the rest of the world, but rather from the
rest of the legal education enterprise. Too often international and
comparative law have been electives, cultural detours from core
subjects such as constitutional law, federal courts, administrative law,
property, and contracts. As a result, international and comparative
law neither receive the respect they deserve, nor face the kind of
bracing examination—using the same methodological tools and
applying the same levels of intellectual discipline and energy—that is
brought to bear on other law school subjects. To make clear its
relevance to all facets of legal training, the disciplines of international
and comparative law must incorporate the rigor, creativity and focus
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that we see in the domestic fields. Curt’s own scholarship stands as a
wonderful example of how to integrate international and foreign law
with the study of the U.S. constitution and the federal courts system.
Second, I hope this Center will break down the isolation of
international and comparative law by encouraging teachers of all law
school courses to draw on foreign and international examples and
experience. For example, courses in criminal law and criminal
procedure could explore the rules and methods of continental Europe
to illustrate plausible alternatives to our approach. The same point
applies to every subject in the regular law school curriculum. We
Americans need to get past the unstated assumption that the
accomplishments of our legal system are unique and possibly
superior. Studying the achievements, as well as the failures, of other
systems can illuminate our own.
Third, I hope the Center will expand the opportunities to work
with and learn from foreign colleagues. Faculty and student
exchanges can turn book learning about foreign law into something
vivid and concrete. More foreign faculty and students mean greater
opportunity for joint research and discussion, both inside and outside
the classroom. Such collaborations not only educate the rest of the
world about the best qualities of the United States—our enduring
commitment to the rule of law and ordered liberty—but enrich our
own understanding. I also hope that this Center can encourage Duke
faculty and Duke students to work and study in foreign countries.
In conclusion, let me say that I am grateful to you, and
particularly to Curt, for allowing me to take part in the inauguration
of this Center. I look forward to learning from your work, and in
having as colleagues, lawyers whom this Center has touched and
made better.

